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There is one thing you can be absolutely sure of when you defend the claim that modern 
science has rendered the existence of the supernatural implausible and that science and re-
ligion are therefore in conflict: you will be accused of a sin called “scientism.” What exactly 
it is that you’re being accused of is not always clear. It certainly isn’t clear in Kelly James 
Clark’s reply (Clark 2015) to my review–essay (Boudry 2015) of his book Religion and the 
Sciences of Origins (Clark 2014). Apart from a vague gesture toward “logical positivism,” 
another bogeyman in modern philosophy, Clark never quite explains what it is that I’m 
guilty of. (By the way, the logical positivists were suspicious of all metaphysics, and would 
never venture the claim that science has disproven the existence of God. They would 
rather claim that the word “God” is meaningless.)
There is no agreed-upon definition of the nebulous concept of “scientism,” except that it is 
a term of abuse meaning something like ”pushing science too far.” Take Clark’s description 
of scientism as “the view that science is applicable, perhaps uniquely, to every domain of 
human inquiry. … Whatever lies outside the domain of science is rejected.” The problem 
is that the significance of “scientism”, thus defined, depends on your precise definition of 
science. Is history a part of “science” or not? I don’t lean one way or the other. If you adopt 
a narrow definition of science that excludes history, no sensible person is a proponent of 
“scientism.” If you construe science broadly enough, encompassing all legitimate domains 
of inquiry based on reason and evidence, many sensible people would be. 
The issue of scientism is thus a diversion. The argument in my essay was that religion 
encroaches upon the territory of “science” (meaning, among others, evolutionary biology, 
ancient history, cosmology, and so on), by making factual claims about reality. Nothing 
in this argument commits me to the view that “science”—however construed—is the only 
acceptable or valid or rational mode of discourse. The proper demarcation of “science” is 
merely a semantic distraction, a territorial quarrel about how we denote certain types of 
knowledge (see Boudry 2013). Clark tries to make space for religion by pointing to other 
truths that “lie outside the domain of science” (mathematics, logic, literary criticism, and so 
on), but the fact is that none of these conflicts with science in the way that religion does. 
Let’s deal with this conflict, then. In his book, Clark argues that theism is “not a scientific 
hypothesis” because it was not arrived at by way of controlled observation and careful hy-
pothesizing. But that, I argued, is to conflate psychological origin and epistemic status. No 
matter what its psychological or historical origins, theism amounts to a factual hypothesis 
about the world with empirical consequences. In his response, Clark ignores my response 
and plays on the same equivocation: “one’s initial and even continuing warrant for belief in 
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God need not (and probably did not) come from its success in explanation or prediction.” 
Rather, such warrant comes from “experiences of God, the testimony of someone who had 
an experience of God, or reading a divinely inspired text.” Hence, God is not a scientific 
hypothesis.
This is really no better than saying that homeopathy is not in conflict with science because 
Samuel Hahnemann, its originator, did not use randomized double-blind trials and relied 
exclusively on anecdotal evidence. The parallel is exact: like homeopathy, theism may have 
originated from and may be sustained by wholly unscientific sources (revelation or inner 
feeling, according to Clark), but it has empirical consequences nonetheless that put it on a 
collision course with science. As I stressed in my review, the medieval Doctrine of the Two 
Books, which Clark uses to reconcile science and religion, actually confirms the conflict 
view, as the Book of Nature has over the ages devoured the Book of Scripture. Instead of 
dealing with these crucial points, Clark (again) expounds Alvin Plantinga’s theory about 
“properly basic beliefs” at length, which tries to put belief in an omnipotent deity in the 
same ballpark as belief in an external world, as not in need of any evidence (actually, we 
have overwhelming evidence for the latter, not for the former).
At the end of his response, Clarke assures us that he “enthusiastically endorse[s] contem-
porary science.” Good; we’re on the same side, then. After that, he adds that “versions of 
theism, those which impinge upon well-established science, need to be reexamined and, 
in some cases, even rejected.” Perfect. But why, then, does Clark take seriously Plantinga’s 
sensus divinitatis, a kind of supernatural brain antenna receiving knowledge of the di-
vine, for which there is not a shred of scientific evidence? If Clark were serious about re-
examining religious views in the light of science, wouldn’t the whole of theism end up on 
the scrapheap?
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